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Producing and Marketing Hogs Under Contract 
1970 
Introd uction 
Over the course of the last two decades. contract arrangements 
have become the tool used to coordinate the production and marketing of 
many U. S. agricultural products. Contracts are the predominate means 
by which most fruits and vegetables are moved to the processor. Almost 
all broilers are produced under contract as arrlo to 35 percent of the 
table eggs and 50 to 60 percent of the turkeys. - Missouri agriculturalists 
were made aware of this trend when a 1967 study rivealed 85 percent of 
the state's turkey production was under contract.~ 
The livestock industry has not been dominated by contracts. How-
ever, it has not been immune to a structural transformation. It has sus-
tained an increased involvement of non-farm interests in the production, 
marketing and financing of livestock. The structure of the industry may 
change drastically in the new decade with more agribusiness vertical 
integration by ownership and by contract. 
Integration by contract is the largest segment of vertical integration 
in livestock.Y Ownership of the feedlot and all associated inputs has 
been used some in beef and sheep. In the hog sector, however, almost 
all vertical integration or similar nonproducer entailment is by contract. 
The use of contracts is not new to hog production. Various forms 
of marketing and financing arrangements have been used for a number of 
years. Through time, these contracts have been modified to coincide with 
a specific price cycle or production period. Firms and producers have 
conformed to this system of marketing or financing usually for short 
periods of time. In most instances, this leisurely participation in con-
tracts has ended. 
Within the last 5 years, there has been an emergence of fresh con-
tract models. Certain meat packers and feed companies desire a perma-
nent fixity in the business. The economic implications are being felt in 
the Missouri hog industry . 
The hog sector is a significant aspect of Missouri agriculture. The 
state produces 7 to 8 million hogs annually which accounts for about 8 
percent of the total U. S. production.!! 
The short period of time many producers have been on contract 
and the area concentration of a particular contractor could have affected 
the attitudes and characteristics of some producers sampled. 
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Consequently, this study may not be a perfect representation of all hog 
contracting. The basic objective is to help hog producers to be better 
informed as to what is happening and to provide useful information for 
those contemplating the contract route. 
This study includes: 
1. A classification and analysis of 1970 hog contracts in Missouri. 
2. A social and economic categorization of a sample of Missouri 
and Nebraska contract hog producers. 
3. An evaluation and critique of the hog contracting process as 
viewed by the contract producers sampled. 
4. A format of economic and legal considerations for producing 
and/or marketing under contract. 
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The Nature of Contracting 
The hog producer, input supplier, and packer have all changed in 
the past 10 years. The structure of the hog economy today more closely 
relates between the production, financing and marketing sectors. A 
primary outgrowth of this structural reformation has been the contract. 
The growth of hog contracting is difficult to quantify. It is possible, 
however, to understand its development and motives behind its application 
by studying the changes in the industry . 
The producer is constantly commanding a larger, more specialized 
hog operation by increasing technology. There is continued interest in 
specializing in one of 2 phases of production; production of feeder pigs or 
feeding hogs from feeder pig to slaughter weight. This has encouraged 
the feeder pig producer to search out new marketing alternatives and the 
finisher to pursue an efficient, constant source of feeder pigs. 
With increasing unit size and lessening in availability of labor, the 
producer is substituting more purchased for non purchased inputs. The 
associated rising costs and credit squeeze causes more financing from 
agribusiness and lending institutions. 
The higher degree of technology and related production costs 
encourage the producer to find ways to transfer some of the growing 
amount of risk linked to his hog operation. The large, highly specialized 
operator is realizing a shrinking profit margin and in some instances has 
a risk too large to carry. 
In summary, many hog producers contract to reduce risks, secure 
financing, or insure their market and supply of hogs. 
The agriculture supply industry is undergoing structural changes 
similar to hog production sector. There are fewer supply firms and 
volume of sales financing per firm is increasing . .§/ High fixed costs 
experienced by many supply manufacturers is putting economic pressure 
on them to expand sales and diversify . 
"Contracts have become a popular competitive strategy of agri-
business firms. ,,§j For the feed supplier, contracts serve to differen-
tiate his product from the competitor's While sewing-up a percentage of 
the market. In respect to financial commitment, the large percentage of 
total costs that feed constitutes makes the hog business especially attrac-
tive to feed manufacturers. 
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The trend in our slaughter hog marketing system has been away 
from central, terminal markets toward decentralized country markets and 
direct selling to packers. With specialization and larger numbers of hogs 
available in a small area, new packing plants have been built in rural 
areas close to the supply. 
Highly mechanized plants with large capital investment require a 
reliable source of hogs to operate efficiently to maintain a high volume 
and to reduce costs per hog slaughtered. Due to the day, week, and 
monthly variation in volume and quality, the packer is feeling the increased 
pressure to seek ways to guarantee his kill while stabilizing price. 
To summarize, the feed companies and packers are motivated to 
contract to increase volume and level of efficiency. A percentage of 
assured business enhances their market position and can yield a more 
streamlined, effiCiently coordinated system. 
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Classification of Hog Contracts 
An assortment of hog contracts has evolved through the years. To 
better understand the contracting process, a classification and analysis 
is necessary. 
Contracts could be classified by several methods. From the stand-
point of the hog producer, an economic analysis was felt to be most 
applicable. Some legal relationships, however, will be introduced later. 
Contracts serve to coordinate the activity within and between the 
steps involved in producing hogs. Condensed, these production steps are 
(1) acquiring the input (hogs and feed), (2) producing, and (3) marketing. 
These steps are used in all phases of production whether it be producing 
feeder pigs, finishing feeder pigs, or producing farrow to finishing hogs .1/ 
The producer operating independently must assume various risks 
associated with ownership, production, and marketing. Production risks 
and market price risks are the two types of business risks. Production 
risks relate to mortality, feed efficiency, health, and quality of the hogs. 
Market price risks relate to fluctuations in the market price of feeder pigs 
or slaughter hogs. 
This analysis is centered around the nature and amount of these 
risks that are transferred from the producer to the contractor. The 
follOwing classification was derived. 
A. Risk Transfer 
1. Guaranteed Payment 
2. Profit Share 
3. Forward Sale 
4. Floor Price 
B. Financing 
1. Breeding Stock Lease 
2. Credit Extension 
C. Marketing Agreement 
Risk Transfer Contracts 
There are a variety of risk transfer contracts. These contracts 
have been grouped in relation to the amount of risk transferred by the 
producer. This varies from a transfer of nearly all risk to a sharing of 
that related to market price. 
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Guaranteed Payment 
The guaranteed payment contract allows the producer to transfer all 
price risk and some of the production risk to the contractor. The con-
tractor furnishes the hogs. The producer furnishes the labor and facilities. 
The producer is guaranteed a specified payment per head or per pound 
regardless of the market price. Variations in payment will depend upon 
which party supplies the feed, medication, and transportation. 
There is no standard specified payment universal to all contracts. 
If a producer is finishing feeder pigs, a common guaranteed payment 
contract might compensate the producer a flat $2 per head marketed or 
2 cents per pound of gain for his labor and facilities. If the producer also 
supplied the feed, one contract guaranteed him 15 cents per pound of gain. 
Where feeder pigs or farrow to finish hogs were produced under this type 
of contract, the contractor usually furnished all inputs except for labor 
and facilities. Return to producer was on a per head basis for feeder pigs 
and per pound on farrow to finish. 
Some contracts also contain provisions allowing bonuses for low 
mortality rates or exceptional feed conversion. (Examples: Tables 1, 
2, and 3.) 
TABLE 1 
BONUS PAYMENT FOR FEED CONVERSION; FINISHING HOGS 
Feed per pound 
of gain 
3.80 
3.79 to 3.70 
3.69 to 3.60 
3.59t03.50 
3.49 
TABLE 2 
Bonus per 
head 
-0-
30~ 
60~ 
90~ 
$1.00 
BONUS PAYMENT FOR LIVABILITY; FINISHING HOGS 
Percent death 
loss 
4.0 
3.99 to 3.0 
2.99 to 2.0 
1. 99 to 1. 0 
.99 to 0 
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Bonus per 
head 
-0-
20~ 
40~ 
60~ 
80~ 
TABLE 3 
BONUS PAYMENT FOR LIVABILITY; FEEDER PIGS 
Pigs Bonus per 
Weaned head 
4 or less -0-
5 50~ 
6 $1.00 
7 1.50 
8 2.00 
9 2.50 
These bonus incentives can prove beneficial to both parties. The 
producer has the opportunity to experience an added return by superior 
management. The contractor may offset the premium payment to the 
producer with lower per unit production cost. 
The producer's return is unrelated to the market price under this 
contract. Thus, all risk due to market price fluctuations is transferred 
to the contractor. The amount of production risk shifted varies depending 
upon which party supplies the feed and medication. Since the contractor 
retains ownership of all hogs, he naturally assumes some of the production 
risk. The producer stands to lose labor and utilities invested. The pro-
ducer's production risk increases if he also supplies feed and medication 
for the animals. 
Since feed constitutes more than one-half of the variable costs of 
raising market hogs, some contractors have sought to equate the risks to 
both parties resulting from fluctuations in feed costs. This is accom-
plished by determining a base cost for the particular type of feed used. 
At the end of a specific time period, the exact cost of all feed is computed. 
The party supplying the feed is either paid or charged an adjustment sum 
to equalize the cost to both parties. 
Profit Share 
The profit share contract is similar to the guaranteed payment in 
respect to the inputs provided by each party. The principal distinction 
is the way the producer is compensated. Under the profit share contract, 
the producer is paid a percentage of the net receipts from the sale of the 
hogs. Since the producer's return is directly related to the market price, 
he is transferring only part of the market price risk rather than all as 
under the guaranteed payment contract. 
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Like guaranteed payment, profit share allows the producer to share 
some of the production risk with the contractor. The contractor furnishes 
the hogs. The producer furnishes labor and facilities. The risk of loss 
of feed, medication, and transportation is usually divided between the 
two parties. This is sometimes handled by splitting the expense of these 
three inputs or subtracting it from the total gross receipts before the 
producer 's return is computed. Another form permits the producer to 
furnish his own corn and receive a percent of the net receipts proportional 
to the adjusted base price of corn. 
In Missouri, this type contract has been geared toward operations 
engaged in finishing feeder pigs to slaughter weight. For example, the 
contractor would furnish hogs, medication, and transportation and the 
producer the labor, faCilities, and feed. From the total gross receipts, 
the contractor might deduct medication and transportation costs. He 
could further deduct 10 cents for every pound the pigs averaged over 45 at 
time of initiating feeding. The producer would then receive 6 percent of 
the remaining receipts. The additional percentage entitled the producer 
would depend upon the base price of corn. The higher the price of corn 
during the feeding period, the larger is the producer's share of the re-
maining receipts. 
Since the profit share agreement enables producer and contractor 
to share production risk and market price risk, economic production 
incentive on the part of the producer is built-in . Contractors install pro-
fitable marketing practices by calculating gross receipts on basis of 
grade and yield cut-out and/ or lowering the percentage return to the pro-
ducer if the average weight of the hogs falls outside a specified range. 
Forward Sale 
A forward sale contract is created when a contractor agrees to pay 
a predetermined price for a specified number of hogs delivered at a 
designated time. As opposed to the two types of contracts just discussed, 
the producer operates independently in the production stage furnishing all 
production components and assuming all production risk. All market price 
risk is transposed to the contractor by way of the guaranteed price. 
Economically, this contract is similar to using the futures market to shift 
price risk. 
Floor Price 
Similar to the forward sale, a producer with a floor price contract 
furnishes all the productive resources and carries all the production risk. 
Unlike the forward sale, however, the producer accepts some as opposed 
to none of the market price risk . In lieu of a predetermined market 
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price, a minimum base price is established. The producer assumes 
some risk by sharing in the return so long as the market price is above 
the fixed base. His market price risk will cease when the market price 
falls to or below the fixed floor price. Since this price is stipulated as 
the minimum amount to be paid the producer, the contractor must absorb 
all risk when the market price falls below this floor. 
Financing Contracts 
The four types of contracts just discussed will allow some or most 
of the production and marketing risks to be alloted between producer and 
contractor. Financing contracts, on the other hand, leave these risks with 
the producer. Financing arrangements principally serve as a medium to 
supply the producer with various inputs essential to hog raising. From an 
economic view, a contractor employing this type contract is performing a 
role similar to a money lender. 
Breeding StOck Lease 
The breeding stock lease is one of the 2 types classified as a 
financing arrangement. The contractor furnishes to the producer breeding 
age boars and gilts for the purpose of producing pigs. The producer pays 
rent for the use of the animals. The lease payments vary depending upon 
the particular contract. Some require a deposit or rental payment upon 
delivery. Payments may consist of either a specified number and weight 
of hog or an equivalent in money at designated intervals. Duration of the 
contract ranges from four to eight litters. Few contracts permit the 
producer to purchase the breeding stock or retain any offspring for breed-
ing purposes. Technically, the contract does not terminate until all initial 
breeding stock and progeny are marketed. The producer usually receives 
a portion of the salvage from the marketed breeding stock. 
There are basically three classes of breeding stock leases in 
Missouri. The principal distinction between the three is the way the 
offspring of the leased swine are marketed. 
The first two are quite similar. One is a leasing arrangement only. 
The producer may market the progeny wherever and whenever he desires 
but they can be sold only for slaughter. The other has a rider attached 
permitting the contractor at his option to purchase from the producer any 
number of pigs produced. This lease plus option contract is prevalent 
where the contractor is interested in securing additional breeding stock. 
The contractor is not required to take a specific number but does generally 
pay a premium over market price for those animals selected. 
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The third lease requires the producer to sell to the contractor at 
feeder pig weight all desirable progeny of the leased swine. The price 
paid for the feeder pigs is derived by a formula based on either the cash 
or futures price for live market weight hogs. Most contracts weight the 
price to encourage marketing pigs at 40 pounds. 
A producer with anyone of the three breeding stock leases experi-
ences an income from the sale of hogs directly correlated with the market 
price. Moreover, he supplies or rents all ingredients of the production 
process. All price risk and most production risk are his except the 
fraction related to death loss of breeding stock. 
Credit Extension 
This type contract is commonly created when a feed firm or similar 
agribusiness provides feed or other production inputs to the producer on 
credit. The contract may be open-end in duration or extend over a 
speCified length of time. The producer owns the hogs and, like the 
breeding stock lease, he is subject to all risks linked to production and 
marketing. The creditor's interest is limited to a possible lien on the 
hogs for satisfaction of the debt. 
Marketing Agreement 
A marketing agreement is an arrangement whereby the producer 
agrees to sell his pigs to one individual or market through a particular 
program. This arrangement has proven popular in the feeder pig industry 
in Missouri by insuring the producers a reputable market for their feeder 
pigs at a to-be-determined price. Most agreements require specific 
quality, health, and weight standards. The producer owns all inputs and 
accepts the price derived by the market. Marketing agreements should 
not be confused with floor price or forward sale contracts where some or 
all of the price risk is passed to the contractor. 
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Relevance of Particular Contract Types 
The emphasis of this study was devoted to four of the seven contract 
types. The following list depicts the four types and the respective risk 
transferred to the contractor. 
Type Contract 
Type I - Guaranteed Payment 
Type II - Profit Share 
Type III - Forward Sale 
Type IV - Breeding Stock Lease 
Risk Transferred to Contractor 
Market Price 
all 
some 
all 
none 
Production 
some 
some 
none 
none 
These 4 types were included in the sample survey based on a con-
viction of their relevance in the structure of the Missouri hog industry. 
The use of guaranteed payment and profit share contracts in hogs 
has increased in recent years. They are almost identical in economic 
objective to the risk transfer contracts used in the poultry industry. The 
varying amounts of risk transferred under these contracts are associated 
with a similar transfer of entrepreneurship. The result in poultry has 
been the transposing of the once independent producer to an economic 
position resembling a "wage earner" and the deterioration of the free 
marketing system. It is easy to recognize how an extensive adoption 
of these two types in the hog business could be significant in determining 
the future role of the producer and the independent marketing system. 
The forward sale contract is used periodically by some hog pro-
ducers. The extent of its application usually varies with the price cycles 
and depends upon the producer's current desire to alleviate uncertainity 
resulting from fluctuations in the live market price. Relative to Type I 
and Type II risk transfer contracts, the forward sale has not experienced 
the increase in use in recent years. The three contracts do, however, 
constitute the bulk of the risk transfer arrangements associated with 
Missouri hog production. 
Breeding stock leases have enjoyed an immense growth in popularity 
within the last ten years. It is presently estimated that approximately 
300,000 sows are leased to producers in the U. S. under this type contract.Y 
If its adoption continues to increase, it could definitely modify some key 
structural characteristics of hog production. Contractors employing the 
lease are altering the structure by shifting the source of ownership of an 
essential input. By tying the producer to a particular brand of feed and 
by initiating certain managerial practices, the contractor is implementing 
a more closely coordinated, vertical system. 
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The floor price contract has sustained far-reaching utilization in 
the poultry industry and some contractors are considering its possible 
merit in the hog business. However, its small use prevented the investi-
gation of its relevance. Credit extension arrangements and marketing 
agreements are integral mechanics of the hog system. They are recasting 
the source of financing and the marketing channels used in the hog business. 
Nevertheless, these contracts impose only a minimal influence on the origin 
of ownership, management, and risk. They probably will have little 
impact on the future structure of the industry . 
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Description of Sample 
The sample survey of contract hog producers was selected from a 
variety of sources. To qualify, it was necessary the producer either 
presently, or within at least three years have been, be under one of the 
four types of contract.~!.~/ Each producer's opinions and characteristics 
were analyzed in reference to his contract. The contract types were 
distributed among the producers as follows: 
5 Type I - Guaranteed Payment 
30 Type II - Profit Share 
5 Type III - Forward Sale 
48 Type IV - Breeding Stock Lease 
88 responses10/ 
The array of contracts may not be an indication of prevalence for 
specific contracts. The relative use of hog contracts could be roughly 
proportional to these responses but the number of producers studied were 
too limited to make such a conclusion. It does, however, indicate the 
awareness and popularity of certain types. 
There was a high degree of adaptation of specific contract types to 
specialized hog production. Contractors used Type I and Type II risk 
transfer arrangements exclusively to finish feeder pigs to market hog 
weight. Five producers used the Type III contract to transfer price risk 
on finished market weight hogs. The feeder pig producing phase was 
incorporated within Type IV. At least 28 of the 48 producers with breeding 
stock leases were specialized feeder pig producer.:s since their contract 
required them to sell all pigs to the contractor at that weight. The other 
20 producers had a lease arrangement in which the contractor could 
purchase the progeny if he desired. Otherwise no marketing weight or 
channel stipulation was imposed. 
Along with breeding stock leases, profit share arrangements have 
become especially popular in recent years. To obtain a larger sample of 
producers on this contract, 18 Nebraska hog men finishing feeder pigs 
under a profit share contract were included in the survey. 
The contract producers were not new to the hog business. The 
majority of them (91 %) had at one time produced hogs other than under 
contract. They were, however, new in respect to contracting. More than 
50 percent of the present contract producers first used contracts in 1970. 
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Characteristics of Contract Hog Producers 
The contract hog producers averaged 41.7 years of age, had 11.6 
years of formal education, and began farming in 1954. These producers 
averaged 159 acres owned, 355 acres operated, and 175 in grain crop. 
The average net income was $4,633 from the farm and $3,963 from non-
farm sources in 1970. 11/ 
Sixty-five percent (57 of 88) owned and operated their land. About 
one-half of these rented additional acreage to farm. Another seven pro-
ducers in the sample were involved in a partnership which served as an 
owner and tenant of land. Sixteen respondents were strictly tenants. 
Another four were hired managers and each of the remaining four were a 
combination of owner, tenant, and manager. 
Thirty-three respondents were members of farm organizations. 
Nineteen of these were affiliated with the American Farm Bureau Feder-
ation. Nine were members of Missouri Farmers' Association and five 
were members of the Pork Producer's Association. Other organizations 
in which producers had associated were: National Farmers' Organization, 
Adult Farmers' Association, Young Farmers' Association, Farmers' 
Union, and various livestock associations. 
One distinctive characteristic of this sample was the 12.5 percent 
directly involved in the commercial feed business. These hog producers 
were either employed by or owned a dealership indicating the coordinative 
compatability of a hog operation and a feed enterprise. 
Missouri producers farrowing pigs from leased sows in comparison 
to Missouri producers finishing feeder pigs under contract were 5. 2 
years younger, had a little less education (.6 years), and began farming 
later in life. The farrowing contractees averaged operating 48 more 
acreage with an additional 118 acres in grain. They had a smaller net 
farm income and depended less on non-farm income. 
The Missouri feeder pig finishers were older, had more formal 
education, and had farmed for a longer period of time than the Nebraska 
feeder pig finishers. In general, the Missouri finishers operated a larger 
acreage but farmed less than one-half as many grain acres while experi-
encing a larger farm and non-farm net income. The smaller grain 
acreage in conjunction with the $4,363 average, additional non-farm 
income could reasonably be attributed to the more than 35 percent (6 of 17) 
of the Missouri finishers who were involved in a commercial feed opera-
tion. In comparison, only 2 of the 18 Nebraska finishers received an 
income from a feed business. 
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TABLE 4 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTRACT HOG 
PRODUCERS, 1970* 
All Farrowing 
con- con- Finishing Contractees** 
Characteristics tractees tractees** Mo. Neb . All 
Number of 
Respondents 88 48 17 18 35 
Present Age 41. 7 40.9 46.1 42.6 44.3 
Education (year) 11. 6 11. 8 12.4 10.7 11.5 
Acreage Owned 159 177 160 129 143 
Acreage Rented 170 203 101 149 126 
Acreage Operated 355 366 318 277 287 
Acreage Tillable 261 282 176 236 207 
Acreage in Grain 175 198 80 170 126 
Median Year 
Began Farming 1954 1954 1946 1956 1951 
Number of 
Respondents 86 46 17 18 35 
Net Income ($) 
Farm 4,633 4,466 6,258 4,364 5,284 
Non-Farm 3,963 3,193 7,433 3,070 4,977 
* 
** 
*** 
All figures, except median year began farming, are computed 
averages based on the number of respondents indicated. 
Missouri producers farroWing pigs from leased breeding stock. 
Producers finishing feeder pigs under contract. 
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Producer Evaluation of Contracting 
Most of the respondents began production and/or marketing under 
contract in 1969 or early 1970. Table 5 lists the reasons producers gave 
for using a contract. 
TABLE 5 
PRODUCER REASONS FOR INITIATING PRODUCTION 
AND/OR MARKETING UNDER CONTRACT 
Responses 
Reason Number As % of total 
Smaller Investment 57 37.3 
Less Risk 28 18.3 
Acquire Better Quality Hogs 22 14.4 
Expectation of Additional Income 20 13.1 
Convenience; Guaranteed Supply 
and Market 15 9.7 
Better Utilization of Labor and 
Facilities 11 7.2 
TO TA rEi 153 100 
The specific item most often cited as the one producers looked for 
in a contract was the clause stipulating the gross return they could expect. 
As Table 6 shows, almost one-third of the total responses designated the 
provision for either the guaranteed price, the specified percentage of 
total receipts or salvage, or the formula for price determination as para-
mount. The second concern was the responsibilities and restrictions of 
each party. This included feed specifications and programs, payment of 
taxes, possible allowance for purchase of contract animals, and quantity 
of management supervision provided. 
Forty of the 88 respondents said they experienced no problem with 
contracts, contractors, or fieldmen. Table 7 summarizes the responses. 
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TABLE 6 
MOST IMPORT ANT ITEMS LOOKED FOR IN A CONTRACf 
ResEonses 
Item Number As % of total 
Gross Returns 62 31. 0 
Each Parties' Responsibilities 
and Restrictions 52 26.0 
Amount of Personal Investment 
or Cost 28 14.0 
Accountability for Death Loss 23 11. 5 
Quality and Health Specifications 21 10.5 
Reputation of Contractor 8 4.0 
Duration of Contract 6 3.0 
TOTAL 200 100 
TABLE 7 
PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED BY HOG PRODUCERS 
WITH CONTRACTS, CONTRACTORS, OR FIELDMEN 
ResEonse& 
Problem Number As % of total 
Lack of Cooperation 19 27.9 
Poor Quality or Health 
of Hogs 14 20.6 
Loss of Independence 14 20.6 
Compulsory Involvement with 
Feed Firm 12 17.6 
Inexperienced Fieldmen 4 5.9 
Complicated or Vague Contract 3 4.4 
Cost Relative to Independent 
Production 2 3.0 
TOTAL 68 100 
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One-half of the respondents dissatisfied with the involvement of feed 
firms elaborated on the channels sale receipts must pass. These channels 
resulted in an extensive lapse of time before any return was received by 
the producer. 
The quality and health of their hogs has been a major selling point 
of agribusiness contractors. They have expressed confidence in their 
ability to assemble and deliver a large volume of superior quality animals. 
To obtain the producer's opinion, the 83 respondents under guaranteed 
payment, profit share, and breeding stock arrangements were asked if the 
contractor had ever delivered unhealthy or low quality hogs to their farm. 
Sixteen of the 35 producers finishing feeder pigs under either a Type I or 
Type II contract and 19 of the 48 leasing breeding stock were displeased 
with the animals delivered. Those discontented accounted for 42 percent 
of the sample with contractor hogs on their farm. Fifty-three percent of 
the Missourians finishing feeder pigs were dissatisfied compared to 39 
percent of the Nebraska finishers. 
In conducting this survey, the failure of the producer to read and/ or 
understand his contract was typical. This was exemplified when the 83 
respondents in possession of contractor owned hogs were asked if the 
contract permitted other hogs to be on the farm. Twenty-seven said "yes," 
49 said "no, " and 12 said "no, but had some anyway." However, an 
evaluation of 78 available contracts revealed 77 specifically stated that no 
other hogs were allowed on the premises. 
Almost no contract allows the contractee to retain or purchase for 
his own breeding herd hogs covered by the agreement. Nevertheless, due 
to either misinformation or a subsequent arrangement, nine respondents 
indicated they could purchase if they so desired. 
The cost of transporting hogs to the designated market is the major 
marketing expense generally carried by the contract producer. The 28 
feeder pig producers trucked their pigs an average 41 miles . All but 
three of the respondents withstood the entire transportation cost. Thirty-
eight of the 40 producers under Type I, Type II, and Type III risk 
transfer contracts were responsible for moving their finished market 
hogs an average 73 miles. The producer paid the cost in five instances 
and the contractor in three. The other 30 responses attested to a sharing 
of the expense either by dividing the cost from total gross receipts. 
Delays in receiving from the contractor either breeding animals or 
feeder pigs was a "costly inconvenience, " agreed some respondents. 
Eleven of the 48 producers leasing breeding stock suffered a delay in 
receiving breeding age gilts. Likewise, 6 of 35 contract finishing pro-
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ducers had to wait on feeder pigs. In the producer's opinion, the wait was 
chiefly due to the inaccessibility of the animals to the contractor--a 
situation discovered by many contractors during that period of relatively 
high hog prices and increased demand for hogs. Nevertheless, some of 
the producers expressed their annoyance at the upset farrowing schedules 
and facilities operating at less than capacity. 
The involvement of feed firms in the contract hog business was 
evident in the study. Even in instances where other than a feed company 
was the original contractor, various feed dealers would function as a 
middleman. While handling and receiving the contract, they would strive 
to tie the producer either formally or informally to a particular brand of 
feed. In this sample, the majority of the producers (81 of 88) paid for 
the feed for their contract hogs. Of these, 26 percent with breeding stock 
leases and 71 percent under risk transfer arrangements were required to 
buy a specific brand of feed. 
Parallel with each type of contract was a varying producer attitude 
as to which party carried the risk associated with death loss of the con-
tract hogs. The producers with a forward sale contract withstood the 
entire loss since they retained ownership and furnished all inputs. 
Twenty-six of the 35 guaranteed payment and profit share producers felt 
the contractor took this risk. Eight of the same type producer said the 
burden was shared while one argued the producer was still responsible. 
Farmers producing pigs from leased sows indicated they assumed nearly 
all production risk except that connected with death loss of breeding stock. 
The majority (39 of 48) of these producers said the contractor carried 
this particular risk and an additional six deSignated the risk as one that 
was shared. From the wording of the particular contracts available, it 
was not possible to determine how many of the producers sampled were 
incorrect in their judgement. The sharing of death loss depending upon 
various inputs supplied and weight of the hogs was not explicit. 
The 88 respondents were limited as to informational sources and 
flexibility within the contracting mechanism. Their knowledge of the 
process was gained from feed dealers, contractors, trade magazines, and 
other producers with feed dealers the recipient of 58 percent of the total 
responses. When approached by the contractor, 29 respondents were 
offered a choice of contracts. But, only 3 of 88 were ever able to nego-
tiate more favorable terms than those first offered. 
The sentiment was that many producers were not only unfamiliar 
with other hog contracts but with their own as well. The lack of under-
standing of their contract was due to either: failure to read, failure to 
comprehend, or failure to have possession of the written document. The 
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latter was verified by the fact that 8 of 88 respondents had oral agree-
ments and another nine with written contracts said they never received 
their copy. 
Respondents were asked to specify the type contract they preferred. 
Twenty-nine of the 88 preferred "none." Another eight indicated they 
had no preference. As a percentage of that specific type in the sample, 
guaranteed payment pocketed the largest share of preferred votes. The 
lease plus option version of the breeding stock lease recorded the smallest 
percentage. These responses should be evaluated in terms of the limited 
knowledge of respondents about other contracts. 
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Volume and Returns of Contract Hog Producers 
There existed within the sample a wide variation in production 
volume and net return of contract hog operations. The actual number of 
hogs produced under the four types of contracts ranged from a low of 313/ 
to a high of 3,500. Net income attributed to the hog enterprise varied 
from zero to $15,000. 
Also present was a broad latitude of hog production experience. 
Initial production of hogs encompased a 1934 to 1970 span with 36 percent 
of the respondents first producing within the last 5 years. Moreover, 
nearly 65 percent of all respondents have continued to raise hogs every 
year. 
This section, devoted to the producer's hog enterprise, is not 
without its possible sources of discrepancy. Some producers had hogs on 
their farm, in addition to those under contract, requiring a detaching of 
data pertinent to the contract animals. To be applicable, it was necessary 
to sort the data obtained from the ranks of three other groups. These 
included: The contract producers who had terminated their agreement 
prior to interviewing, individuals who launched their contract hog program 
in 1970 resulting in no marketings during the year, and those respondents 
failing to divulge specific information. 
It should be emphasized that the data reflects experience during a 
year with a constant decline in the market hog price. It can be assumed 
that the analytic picture of income and returns is affected by the circum-
stance. 
Analysis of the hog operation could have been handled in numerous 
ways. To include all qualified respondents, the investigation process was 
focused on two clusters; (1) producers with leased breeding stock, and (2) 
producers under risk transfer contracts. 
Breeding Stock Lease 
Producers with breeding stock leases were categorically analyzed 
under either specialized feeder pig contracts or lease plus option arrange-
ments. Statistics were based upon 27 of the original 28 feeder pig 
producers and 19 of the original 20 lease plus option contractees. 
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TABLE 8 
PRODUCTION AND MARKETING STATISTICAL AVERAGES OF 
PRODUCERS ON BREEDING STOCK LEASES, 1970 
Production Feeder Pig Lease Plus 
Feature Production Option 
Sows Farrowed 74 75 
Litters Farrowed 104 85 
Pigs Farrowed Per Litter 9.4 8.9 
Pigs Weaned Per Litter 6.7 7.6 
Total Contract Pigs Sold 697 *** 
Weight Per Pig Sold 44.1 *** 
Price Per Cwt. $26.92 *** 
*** no specified marketing channel. 
In 4 of 19 lease plus option contracts, the contractor chose to pur-
chase. On the average, 20 percent of the progeny of these four herds was 
selected. 
The swine venture was a significant aspect of all 48 respondent's 
total farm operations. The producers on both subtypes of lease raised an 
average of 786 hogs in 1970. Thirty-nine of the 48 respondents farrowed 
in central confinement units ranging from converted chicken houses to 
modern slatted floor houses. Over the last 5 years, these same producers 
have invested an average $1,557 per year in hog facilities. 
The portion of the net farm income that could be attributed to the 
hog enterprise was difficult to calculate. Sufficient information on 32 of 
48 producers revealed an average net return of approximately $2,672. 
This accounted for nearly 47 percent of their net farm income in 1970. 
Risk Transfer Contracts 
Data was adequate to allow a partial, tabular summary of 36 of 40 
risk transfer contractees. Included were all 5 guaranteed payment 
feeders, 12 Missouri and 16 of 18 Nebraska profit share feeders, and 3 of 
5 respondents selling under a forward sale arrangement. 
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TABLE 9 
PRODUCTION AND MARKETING STATISTICAL AVERAGES OF 
PRODUCERS ON RISK TRANSFER CONTRACTS, 1970 
Production Guaranteed Profit Share Forward 
Feature Payment All Mo. Neb. Sale 
Total Hogs Raised 1,269 601 1,065 296 989 
Total Contract Hogs Sold 302 467 850 179 366 
Weight Per Hog Sold 228 220 217 222 225 
Median Year First 
Raised Hogs 1967 1953 1948 1958 1967 
As Table 9 shows, many producers had contract hogs as a supple-
ment to their entire swine operation. In all but one of the 40 instances 
the risk transfer contract was used in the feeder pig to finished market 
weight phase of production. 
In total, the 40 respondents averaged raising 733 hogs in 1970. 
Only nine finished hogs in confinement and another 23 pasture fed all hogs. 
The result was a limited $498 per year investment in all hog facilities 
Estimates of net return to the contract hogs were difficult to compute. 
Data was gathered for the total hog operations of 33 of the 40 respondents. 
Their average net return was $764 or 36.3 percent of their net farm income. 
Missouri profit share contract producers have raised hogs longer 
than the Nebraskans. In 1970, the Missouri averaged 774 more hogs 
raised and an additional 671 fed under contract. Ten of 12 Missouri res-
pondents averaged a $727 net return to hogs while 14 of 18 Nebraska pro-
ducers averaged $560. These returns accounted for 46.9 percent and 
23.6 percent of their respective net farm incomes. 
Respondents adopting risk transfer contracts first raised hogs in 
1957 as compared to 1955 for those leasing breeding stock. The risk 
transfer contractees had less invested in facilities, raised fewer hogs in 
1970, and experienced a smaller net return to their hog operation. 
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Economic and Legal Implications of Contracting 
The gradual acceptance of contracts in the hog business is generating 
a number of economic and legal implications for the producer's entire 
farming operation. A precautious analysis and defining of all contract 
term is imperative. 
The provisions discussed are not applicable to all contracts. The 
objective is to point out some general clauses the producer should be 
concerned with. 
Economic 
The composition of the contract should be clear, concise, and com-
plete without being unduly long. No purpose is usually served by a com-
plex, wordy contract that fails to define all provisions. The producer 
should outline each contract term in relation to his particular operation 
and judge its feasibility. 
Some significant aspects to consider are: the duration of the contract, 
deliver.y date and weight, and the number of feeder pigs or sows to be 
delivered. Most of these contracts also supply management assistance and 
supervision. Knowing the availability, capability, and cost of this input 
is important. 
Many contracts, though not stated in writing, require the producer 
to feed a particular brand of feed. This feed could be higher in price or 
lower in quality than the kind ordinarily fed. Other costs are associated 
with the quality and health of the animals delivered. Equally important 
is the division of death loss and determination of the party responsible 
for payment of taxes and insurance. 
Individuals producing or finishing feeder pigs should evaluate the 
marketing segment of the contract closely. Not only the payment or share 
of the receipts but when, where, and at what weight to market have an 
economic significance. The buying of feeder pigs by the contractor at 40 
pounds intensifies his opportunity for gains and profit as opposed to a 50 
pound purchase. Likewise, the producer's potential for a feed conversion 
premium may be affected by the weight to which he is to feed the hogs. 
Transportation to the market is important from a standpoint of both out-
of-pocket cost and shrink. These allowances should be stipulated in the 
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contract along with a time interval within which the producer can expect 
payment for his service and reimbursement for any added costs. 
A producer leasing breeding stock should inspect the type and 
amount of compulsory rent payment. Whether the payment is in cash or 
a specific weight hog at designated intervals, the monetary value should 
be tabulated and converted to an annual interest rate. If the rent is in 
cash. the contractor will usually base the payment on a terminal market 
price.. This will sometimes be a market in the Eastern Corn Belt where 
prices are usually 25 to 50 cents higher than those in the Western half. 
The actual interest rate varies considerably with each lease as do 
the services provided. Some contracts computed in excess of a 90 per-
cent simple., annual interest charge over the life of the contract. This 
surplus charge is the net income given up to rent as opposed to owning. 
Assuming, that is, the production is comparable under both conditions 
and an alternative source of capital is available. 
Various lease qualifications may compensate for part or all of this 
extra cost. A monetary value needs to be established for the possible 
higher sow conception rate, additional pigs per litter, higher rate of gain, 
better feed conversion, and/or higher market price as a result of in-
creased quality. Management supervision and in some cases a guaranteed 
market for the pigs produced are important. 
The amount of return from salvaged breeding stock and the average 
number of hogs the contractor will select under a lease plus option 
arrangement are relevant. In most instances where the hogs selected 
return a premium to the producer, additional work is necessary on his 
part. 
The final prominent feature the producer must consider is the pro-
cedure for replacing non-productive breeding stock. This is important 
for operational capacity and for having accurate basis of productive sows 
for rent. Some leases state that rent is calculated on the total number of 
breeding animals delivered with no mention of allowances for death or 
nonbreeders. The formula for rent determination should be subject to 
rebate on nonproducing animals. Also, to be equitable, the contractor 
must pay for the gilts if replaced from those raised by the producer. If 
not, the contractor's replacement punctuality should be determined before 
signing. 
The risk transfer contracts are of a special nature. Shifting of 
ownership, though not economic in temperament, takes on this connotation. 
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Profitability in all phases of production is most surely affected by the 
source of decision making. Also, the amount of production risk shifted is 
not dependent upon ownership alone but is linked as well with the party 
furnishing feed. In relation to transferring market price risk, a sharing 
of the losses when prices are low also means a sharing of profits during 
high prices. 
Legal 
A contract is defined in general terms as an agreement between two 
or more persons to do or not to do a specific thing. The breach of such 
an agreement gives remedy by law. You probably should always consult 
a legal authority before signing any agreement. 
The contract should be explicit about the rights, duties, and 
responsibilities of both parties involved. It should contain at least five 
elements: names of the parties, description of property, date and time 
in effect, how much and in what manner rent is to be paid or profits 
shared, and signatures of the parties. The right to terminate the contract 
or to assign the performance to another producer is also notable. 
The pork industry might profit by some legal issues experienced in 
the broiler sector. An arbitration provision in the contract may help to 
avoid costly court procedures. Even though disputes should not arise, a 
clause of this type designating an outside party as a nonbiased arbitrator 
can save much time and money if disagreements do arise. As a supple-
ment, a liquidated damages clause can stipulate the amount of damages, 
if any, each part would be entitled to if the other defaulted in his perfor-
mance. 
In most instances, the phrasing of contracts is done by the contractor. 
The producer needs to be familiar with the implications of these clauses. 
One term common to many contracts specifically states that all hogs, even 
those produced from leased breeding stock, will at all times remain under 
the ownership of the contractor. The producer may not mortgage or 
otherwise encumber the animals. Yet, these same contracts specify the 
producer is responsible for paying all taxes and insurance on these animals 
that he legally does not own. 
Another aspect is the legal relationship created by the agreement. 
Contractors try to avoid a partnership, joint venture, principal-agent, 
or master-servant relationship with their contractee. To avoid respon-
sibility for the debts or actions of the producer to third parties, the 
terminology applied by the contractor to the producer will be one of an 
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independent contractor. However, what is attempted by the contractor 
has little impact on what actually exists. Rather, it is only an indication 
of the contractor ' s intent. There is a fine line drawn as to the amount of 
control the contractor may exercise to retain ownership while still not 
being susceptible to liability. 
An oral contract covering one year or less is just as legal and 
binding as a written agreement. The difficulty might arise, however, in 
proving validity, nature, or extent in case of a disagreement. Oral agree-
ments or evidence prior to a written contract are in no way enforceable if 
it contradicts the written. 
Though not included in the study, the implications of one particular 
contract detected during the survey deserves mentioning. The conditional 
sales contract allows the producer to purchase the sows during the course 
of production by paying specific amounts at designated intervals. The 
possible danger of this type agreement is in the contractor's right to enter 
and take full possession upon the producer's failure to either make pay-
ments on time or care for the animals in a reasonable manner. Similar 
clauses stipulating timely payments and prudent husbandry practices were 
customary in most breeding stock leases and risk transfer contracts. 
However, the risk of direct monetary loss is increased where neither 
management practices are outlined nor amount of remittance specified. 
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Producer Future Involvement in Contracts 
The intent of the hog producers sampled as to their future involve-
ment in contracts was studied. With reference to the total hog operation, 
14 were preparing to increase, 45 contemplated producing about the same 
volume, 21 planned to decrease and eight were quitting the hog business. 
At time of interviewing, 4 of 88 respondents had terminated their 
respective contracts in 1968 or 1969. Another 34 ceased participation 
under the contract either during or at the conclusion of 1970. The re-
maining 50 were still under agreement. 
Twenty-nine of the 38 producers who concluded their contract prior 
to the interview were under a risk transfer arrangement and the remain-
ing nine had breeding stock leases. The batch to batch or year to year 
duration of most risk sharing varieties would partially be responsible for 
the high discontinuence concurrent with this type. Ten of these 38 said 
they signed again with their previous contractor for 1971. Another three 
producers indicated that if they signed it would be with the same con-
tractor. Of the remaining 25, three were uncertain whether they would 
consider any contract and 22 would definitely not produce and/or market 
under contract in 1971. 
Forty of 50 respondents presently under contract expressed their 
termination date as follows: 25 in 1971, 11 in 1972, and 4 in 1973. The 
other 10 said their agreement was continuous in duration, subject to 
cancellation at the discretion of either party. In actuality, the written 
contracts held by 7 of these 10 respondents stipulated a specific expiration 
data of which they were unaware. 
Relative to future participation, a grouping of intentions of the 50 
revealed: 21 would continue with the same contractor, three said if they 
sign again it will be with the same contractor, nine were uncertain about 
ever signing another agreement upon termination of present, and 20 
stated they would not sign with any contractor. 
Summarizing the intentions of all 88 respondents. 
31--did or will sign with same contractor. 
6--will sign with same contractor if sign at all. 
9--uncertain about signing with any contractor. 
42--will not sign a contract. 
The 42 not planning to produce and/or market under contract con-
sisted of 21 of 48 with breeding stock leases and 21 of 40 on risk transfer 
contracts. 
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The various reasons given by the 42 for not signing another contract 
reflected both the general nature of some contracts and the problems 
experienced with various types. Thirty-three percent of the total 
responses were dissatisfied with monetary gains possible under contract. 
Another 18 percent showed producer disgruntlement over involvement of 
feed firms in their business including feed brand requirements, added 
expense, and delays in receiving returns. Thirteen percent symbolized 
accumulation of adequate experience and/or capital to initiate hog pro-
duction independently and another 13 percent signified quitting the hog 
business as the reason for cancellation. The health or quality of hogs 
below expectation received 9 percent of the total responses while loss of 
independence and various contractor problems accounted for the remainder 
of the reasons mentioned. 
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Summaty and Conclusions 
Vertical coordination via contract has emerged in the hog industry 
to accompany four principal factors. These structure altering factors are: 
1. Continued commercialization, specialization, and increase in 
average size of hog operations. 
2. Competition among packers and input suppliers to reduce costs 
and improve efficiency. 
3. Technological advancement in all phases of production and 
marketing. 
4. Increasing demand for uniform quality and quantity of pork at 
a stable price. 
With the share of farm receipts spent for production increasing and 
the profit margin per dollar of receipts decreasing, some producers have 
been attracted to the contract. It ha.s served as a valuable tool to aid 
financing or shift a portion of the growing amount of risk associated with 
the hog business. The meat packers and feed companies feel the contract 
is an attractive instrument for increasing the level of operating efficiency 
and laying claim to a share of the market. 
Relative to the production and market price risk transferred to the 
contractor, the following economic classification of all hog contracts was 
derived. 
A. Risk Transfer 
1. Guaranteed Payment 
2. Profit Share 
3. Forward Sale 
4. Floor Price 
B. Financing 
1. Breeding Stock Lease 
2. Credit Extension 
C. Marketing Agreement 
The contractor owns all hogs under the guaranteed payment or pro-
fit share allowing the producer to shift some production risk under either 
type. The producer transfers all market price risk with the guaranteed 
payment and some with a profit share. The producer retains ownership 
with the other two types of risk transfer contracts thus assuming all 
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production risk. Relative to market price risk, all is shifted to the con-
tractor with a forward sale but only some with a floor price. 
Little, if any, risk is shifted through financing contracts. Breeding 
stock leases and credit extension arrangements primarily serve to 
facilitate buying production inputs by the producer. 
Producers with marketing agreements also carryall production and 
price risk associated with the hog business. The contract is created 
when the producer agrees to se11 a11 pigs to a specific individual or through 
a particular program. 
Producers with the fo11owing four types of contracts were surveyed. 
Type I--Guaranteed Payment 
Type II--Profit Share 
Type III--Forward Sale 
Type IV --Breeding Stock Lease 
In general, the four types were adapted to specialized production 
phases. The 30 respondents with Type I and Type II contracts finished 
feeder pigs to slaughter hog weight. The five producers with a Type III 
used the contract to shift price risk on finished market weight hogs. 
Twenty-eight of 48 with a Type IV were specialized feeder pig producers 
se11ing their pigs to the contractor at 40 to 60 pounds. The remaining 20 
under Type IV could market as they desired unless the contractor chose 
to exercise his option to purchase the progeny. 
The 88 respondents averaged 42 years of age, 12 years of education, 
and operated 355 acres. In 1970, their average net income was $4,633 
from the farm and $3,963 from non-farm. A significant portion of the 
non-farm income can be attributed to the 13 percent of the respondents 
directly involved in a commercial feed business. 
The hog enterprise was a vital segment of each respondent's total 
operation in 1970. They averaged 761 hogs produced and received 42 
percent of their net income from the sale of hogs. In general, producers 
leasing breeding stock as opposed to those with risk transfer contracts 
were younger, farmed more acreage, raised more hogs and experienced 
a larger net return from their hog enterprise in 1970. 
Most of the producers first initiated contractual production and/or 
marketing in 1969 or 1970. The majority of the respondents (91%) had 
raised hogs before involvement in contracts. Many sti11 had hogs on the 
farm in addition to those contracted. 
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The year 1970 was plagued with a constantly declining market hog 
price requiring a sorting of the problems related to contracting. Lack of 
contractor or fie1dman cooperation, inferior health and quality of hogs, 
loss of independence, and involvement of feed dealers were among the 
major problems expressed by the respondents. The complexity of most 
contracts and producer failure to read and/or understand resulted in a 
misconception of the process in many instances. Producers began to 
realize their tie to a non-farm interest and transfer of risk also meant 
giving up some entrepreneurship and profit sharing. 
Analysis of contracts paired with a producer evaluation revealed a 
number of economic and legal considerations. A contract should be com-
plete, concise, and define the rights and responsibilities of both parties. 
Each provision should be outlined and appraised both economically and 
legally. 
Only two respondents had experience with more than one type of 
contract. Almost one-half of the producers indicated this first entangle 
was to be their last. Forty-two of 88 signified they would definitely not 
sign another contract. 
Contracting-Its Future Role 
There has been and will most probably continue to be regional dif-
ferences in contract application. Even though contracting does exist in 
the Midwest, the incidence is manifest in the fringe production areas 
rather than in the Corn Belt where about 75 percent of the hogs are pro-
duced. These areas are more susceptible to contracting by feed companies 
for two reasons. First, it is more profitable for the feed firm and 
receives more emphasis in feed deficit areas where complete rations are 
purchased as opposed to feed surplus areas where only supplements are 
purchased. Secondly, these areas are experiencing a relatively high 
percentage of growth in hog production and are in need of management 
assistance and finanCing for new operations. Meat packers building plants 
in these new areas are more inclined to offer contracts to obtain supplies 
than are packers who have adequate supplies in traditional production 
areas. 
It seems likely that risk transfer contracts and breeding stock leases 
must provide significant services and yield a return more comparable to 
independent production. Otherwise. producers will not intentionally forego 
the possibility of windfall profits and accept a loss of independence. On 
the other hand, the agribusiness contractor feels he needs a higher return 
because of the added financial strain and risk he encounteres. The con-
tractor has assembled larger amounts of working capital and competent 
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personnel trained in swine management. He also assumes a high degree 
of risk when disease strikes or prices fall. 
The swine industry, to remain competitive, must find a more 
efficient way to move pork from farm to consumer with a stable volume, 
quality, and price. Marketing cooperatives and bargaining associations 
that already exist in agriculture may become more important in the hog 
industry to negotiate marketings and regulate production. Currently, 
however, the trend is toward vertical integration by contract. 
Attitudes differ among the participants of the hog industry as to the 
relevance of the present tendency toward contracts. Over the last two 
decades contracts have experienced a somewhat cyclical popularity. Some 
feel no significant influence will be exerted on the structure of the industry 
by the contract trend. Others acknowledge it as one that could reach a 
magnitude similar to the poultry sector. 
The authors feel the hog industry, at least in the near future, will 
remain largely in the hands of the independents. Our assumption is based 
on the theory that until hog diseases can be better controlled, the contractor 
can not assume the high degree of production risk associated with raising 
hogs. If diseases can ever be satisfactorily controlled, management will 
not be such a critical factor. It would be possible then to increase pro-
duction rapidly through adoption of technology. A few producers will be 
able to handle a large volume of hogs. When this happened in the poultry 
industry, contracting flourished and live markets disappeared. Agribusi-
ness contractors managed and virtually controlled all facets of production, 
marketing, and financing. Whether or not the same thing happens to the 
hog industry will depend upon changes made once the disease problem is 
overcome. 
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Appendix 
Sampling Procedure 
A major difficulty in conducting the study was obtaining a sample of 
hog producers who were, or recently had been, producing and/or marketing 
under contract. Through correspondence and personal contact with farm 
management specialists and livestock specialists of the Extension Division 
and the cooperation of various packers and feed dealers, a population was 
determined. 
A sample of 85 hog producers was chosen from the last 3 years in 
one or more of the four contract types. The total of 88 respondents 
resulted from the simultaneous involvement of two producers in more than 
one contract hog operation. 
The producers sampled were concentrated in the western one-half 
and southeastern corner of Missouri, and the northeastern one-quarter of 
Nebraska. The 28 counties in which the Missouri producers resided were: 
Barton, Buchanan, Caldwell, Cape Girardeau, Carroll, Cass, Clinton, 
Daviess, Gentry, Grundy, Howard, Jasper, Johnson, Lafayette, Living-
ston, McDonald, Mississippi, Moniteau, Newton, Nodaway, Pettis, Platte, 
Randolph, Ray, St. Clair, Saline and Vernon. The three Nebraska 
counties were: Cuming, Dodge, and Wayne . 
The data was obtained by personal interviews with each producer. 
The University of Missouri Field Research Team conducted the interviews 
during the month of January, 1971. Copies of specific contracts were 
obtained from producers, contractors, and other sources. 
The information secured is considered confidential in nature. 
Statistics, other than those presented in this publication, cannot be 
released . However, any interested party may obtain a sample copy of 
the questionnaire by contracting the Department of Agricultural Economics. 
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and (2) Comparing one contract to another. Since this study was 
exploatory in nature, we assessed the first approach most feasible. 
Our obj ective was to sample the producer's response relative to 
each contract with which he was involved. This would give us a 
basis for analysis and comparison between the four economic types. 
From this, the reader might draw inference and compare contract 
production to his own conception of an independent operation. The 
total number of individual respondents was 88 while in actuality only 
85 producers were interviewed. The additional three were a result 
of two producers simultaneously operating under more than one 
contract. Eighty-eight was considered the realistic basis for com-
putation since the individual responses of the two producers varied 
with each contract type. Thus, their evaluation of each type was 
analyzed independently. 
11. A. Net farm income is the net return, including cash and nonmoney 
items, to the farm operator for the use of his labor, capital, and 
management (realized gross farm income minus farm production 
expenses). Net non-farm income is the gross income from non-
farm sources minus the out-of-pocket expenses incurred in obtaining 
the income. 
B. Net income tabulations were based on the number of producers 
supplying sufficient information. 
12. The totals in Tables 5, 6, and 7 indicate that more than one response 
per respondent was applicable in certain instances. 
13. The 3 was recorded by a producer who experienced a major disease 
outbreak in 1970. 
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